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Abstract 
Ownership is said to be the key principle of efficient aid and crucial for a successful 
outcome of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). However, it is a contested concept 
and has been criticised for being vague and contradictory. This study discusses 
problems of developing cooperation and aid, with focus on the concept of ownership, 
and tries to define ownership and assess the state of ownership in Rwanda through the 
definition. The Rwandan ownership is assessed through an external and an internal 
dimension, where the behaviour of the donors, the Government of Rwanda (GoR), and 
the domestic stakeholders in Rwanda has implications for the state of ownership. 
Ownership is defined as government leadership and stakeholder participation in the 
PRS process. The study concludes that the state of ownership in Rwanda is mixed; 
there are indicators of both strong and weak ownership. The government leadership is 
strong, but there are contradictions in the relation to donors that complicate the state of 
external ownership. There is space for stakeholder participation in the PRS process, 
but the openness of the space can be discussed, and the capacity to participate among 
stakeholders is weak. Moreover, the controversial aspects of ownership are still in 
question; Rwanda can exemplify the vague as well as the contradictory features of the 
concept. 
 
Key words: Rwanda, ownership, Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), government 
leadership, stakeholder participation.  
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1 Introduction 
The concept of country ownership1 has been the key principle for efficient aid in the 
last decade. For poverty reduction to become successful, i.e. for aid to be efficient, 
donors shall not impose policies and decide what recipient countries shall do to 
develop. Instead, strategies shall be owned by the recipient; strategies shall be 
designed by the country in concern and the poor themselves shall be involved in the 
process of reducing poverty.  
 
However, the concept of ownership is controversial. It is criticised for being vague, 
ambiguous and slippery; a buzzword in the international aid discourse that is no longer 
of use (see Buiter 2007, Cornwall – Brock 2005). There are diverging attitudes 
towards the definition of ownership, what to incorporate in the concept and which 
phenomenon the term is referring to. Ownership is also said to be contradictory or 
paradoxical since it is hard to claim a country owns its development strategies when 
they are financed by external funding; there can be no real ownership as long as a 
country is aid dependent (Raffinot 2009, Hayman 2006).  
 
What does this imply for developing countries? If country ownership is said to be 
crucial for poverty reduction there might be a risk in not defining the concept 
explicitly; developing countries will not know how to improve. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate the implications of ownership. What is ownership? What do 
the official policies say? Can ownership be used at all when the definition is vague and 
slippery? Will the controversial aspects of the concept still be there when assessing 
ownership in a country?  
 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘country ownership’ and ‘ownership’ will be used interchangeably in the rest of the paper. 
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This study aims at investigating the concept of ownership in theory and in practice 
through looking at the case of Rwanda. This is a country that is often claimed to 
possess strong ownership (World Bank 2008a). Through looking at ownership in a 
certain case it will be possible to look deep into the concept and find out important 
aspects and implications.  
 
The specific research question of this study is: What is the state of ownership in 
Rwanda? To answer this question, ownership first has to be defined and 
operationalised in theory. This will be done from the literature of ownership, where 
academic literature as well as official documents from international organisations are 
used. The operationalisation of ownership constitutes the theoretical framework, and 
there will also be a suggestion of how to assess ownership qualitatively. Thereafter, 
ownership will be assessed in the case of Rwanda. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
about the state of ownership in Rwanda, as well as theoretical implications learned 
from the analysis of Rwanda. The study concludes that ownership is partly strong in 
Rwanda. The picture is not black or white; there are certain factors in Rwanda that 
weaken the state of ownership, even if there are indications of strong ownership as 
well. Moreover, the analysis of the state of ownership in Rwanda will illustrate the 
problematic aspects of the concept, for example the importance of defining the concept 
before judging the state of ownership, and the contradictions between ownership and 
conditionality.  
 
This is a combined literature study and a field study. The theoretical framework has 
been based on the recent literature about the concept of ownership and the case study 
of Rwanda has been carried out in Rwanda. The empirical material for Rwanda comes 
from interviews and documents. Representatives from donors, the civil society, the 
Parliament and Government of Rwanda (GoR) were interviewed in Kigali in Rwanda 
between the 17th of June and 7th of August 2009. Documents from donors, civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and the GoR have complemented the interviews in the 
empirical material.  
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The interviews had the character of non-structured conversations to get a deeper 
understanding of the subject. Questions about the Rwandan context in general and 
about the state of ownership were posed, and the questions were adjusted to be suitable 
to the role of the interviewee. It is always difficult to be able to rely on the answers 
from the interviewees; they might speak on behalf of a certain interest. However, 
caution was taken because of this. Most of the material used from the interviewees 
reflects general views and have been confirmed by other sources. In the case of 
opinions from an interviewee reflected in the text, it is clarified that it is from one 
person only. Moreover, there is always a risk that the questions and the interpretations 
of answers might be affected by preconceptions related to the subject. This aspect has 
been taken into account through trying to be as objective as possible. The interviewees 
have not been selected according to a certain principle but there have been attempts to 
get a balanced composition of interviewees from different groups of actors through a 
“snowball effect”. The answers from the interviewees were often useful, even if there 
were some problems because of language and lack of understanding of the subject. On 
the whole, the interviews were helpful to get a deeper understanding of Rwanda and 
the state of ownership.  
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2 Ownership in theory 
This chapter operationalises the concept of ownership settled on a definition that will 
be the basis for the analysis of ownership in Rwanda.  
2.1 What is country ownership? 
Country ownership refers to the principle that poverty reduction shall come from 
within. In contrast to the previous aid principle of conditionality, ownership implies 
that the country in concern shall decide upon strategies to reduce poverty so that the 
local context is taken into account and that the strategy is supported by the population. 
This will lead to better aid effectiveness and a more successful outcome of the poverty 
strategy.  
2.1.1 Definition 
As said in the introduction, ownership is difficult to define as there are many 
definitions used in different situations; people refer to different phenomena when 
talking about ownership. As this study aims at assessing ownership in Rwanda the 
definition used here has to be clear. In brief, this study defines ownership as 
government leadership and stakeholder participation in the process of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS). However, as the definition relates to many aspects it needs 
further explanation.  
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2.1.2 Explanation 
To change the international aid structure away from the criticised Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP), the World Bank introduced the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) in 19992. Today, the PRS is the most common medium-term 
development strategy in aid receiving countries. It is constructed to enhance ownership 
and it is used by donors to channel aid. Therefore, the definition of ownership in this 
study is delimited to the ownership of the PRS. However, the strategy in itself is not 
interesting; it is the process of designing, implementing and monitoring the strategy 
that shows the state of ownership (Raffinot 2009).  
 
The concept of ownership refers to different principles. For example, the principle that 
the PRS shall reflect the needs and priorities of the country in concern so that the local 
context is taken into account (Morrissey – Verschoor 2003), the principle that recipient 
governments, rather than the external partners, shall master and control the public 
policy (Raffinot 2009), and the principle that the majority of the population and its 
representatives shall participate in the PRS process (Eberlei 2007).  
 
However, the different principles can be difficult to sort, especially if one explicit 
definition of ownership is used. Therefore, this study will analyse ownership through 
two dimensions of ownership: external and internal ownership (Hayman 2006, Mills – 
Darin-Ericsson 2002). These dimensions have helped to identify different actors 
within the PRS process and different indicators of ownership. External ownership 
refers to a relationship between the recipient government and the donors, where the 
recipient shall lead the PRS process, and donors shall use a hands-off approach. 
Internal ownership refers to the relationship between the government and the internal 
stakeholders, where the government shall include stakeholders in the PRS process and 
the stakeholders shall participate. Thus, the indicators of ownership used in this study 
are recipient government leadership, donor hands-off, government inclusion, and 
domestic stakeholder participation. 
                                                 
2 See www.worldbank.org/prsp 
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Figure 1. Ownership indicators 
Source: Partly developed from Cling et al 2002:180 
 
This figure summarises the indicators of ownership and the relationships between the 
different actors in the PRS process. Below there will be a deeper explanation of the 
indicators with more specific examples of what they comprise. However, focus will be 
on the relations between the government and the donors and the domestic stakeholders 
respectively; the support indicator from donors to domestic stakeholders is somehow 
included in the external ownership dimension. 
2.1.3 Emphasis in the definition 
The definition used in this study is also derived from the Accra Agenda for Action, the 
final document from the conference on aid effectiveness in Accra 2008 (OECD 
2008b). Together with the Paris Declaration 2005 (OECD 2005), Accra has set the 
international standards for aid assistance where donors and recipients have signed to 
enhance ownership. Therefore, the definition used in these documents is important for 
the practical implications of ownership. However, the definition used by the Paris 
Declaration 2005 has been criticised for mainly focusing on the government leadership 
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(OECD 2008a, Dürr et al 2008). In the Accra Agenda for Action the definition was 
broadened and stakeholder participation was said to be crucial for the ability of a 
country to own its PRS. Hence, more emphasis now lies on stakeholder participation 
and the internal dimension of ownership. Democratic ownership and civic rights were 
also discussed in relation to a broadening of the concept, and Accra stated that this 
issue has to be further explored (OECD 2008a). The democratic aspect of ownership 
and the PRS has not yet been emphasised by the World Bank (Dürr et al 2008). 
2.2 How to assess ownership 
This study will assess ownership according to the operationalisation of the concept 
used here. Hence, the assessment is made through the different qualitative indicators 
within the external and internal dimensions of ownership. The indicators will be 
assessed along the design, implementation, and monitoring parts of the PRS process as 
it is ownership of the PRS process that is in focus. The design process implies 
formulating the strategies, goals and means of poverty reduction, and to prioritise 
among policies. The implementation process is meant to put the strategy into practice 
through translating the priorities in the PRS to the budget, and formulating more 
operational strategies that correspond to the medium-term PRS. In the monitoring 
process the implementation is evaluated to improve the process in the future and 
strengthen accountability.  
 
The indicators used in this study can be exemplified in many ways depending on the 
context. Two factors that are important to the indicators are formal structures and 
capacity. These factors can be used to identify and assess indicators of ownership in 
the PRS process. Enwistle (2005) argues that ownership is more likely to occur with 
the right formal structures for the PRS process. Accra Agenda for Action stresses the 
fundamental importance of capacity for ownership; if countries do not have the 
capacity to lead or participate, the prospects for ownership are small. Examples of 
formal structures are laws, rules, institutional frameworks, coordination, consultation, 
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etc. Capacity can be skills, number of skilled people, knowledge of the rules, access to 
information etc. (Eberlei 2007). 
2.3 External ownership 
External ownership refers to the relationship between donors and the recipient 
government. This relationship shall be based on a partnership between donors and the 
recipient government, where both parts have obligations: donors shall use a hands-off 
approach while the government shall lead the PRS process (UN 2008, OECD 2005). 
 
The partnership approach is based on ideas from the World Bank’s Common 
Development Framework3 (CDF) and has been further elaborated in the Paris 
Declaration on aid effectiveness. It stands in contrast to the previous conditionality 
relationship where donors put conditions on loans (see IMF 2009). Recipient countries 
had to fulfil the conditions to receive loans and they did not have much influence on 
the policies they had to implement. Now there is focus on recipient government 
leadership, dialogue and negotiations of the aid policy setting in the PRS. However, 
even though recipient governments have received more space for agenda setting etc, 
this does not imply donors are absent. Since recipient governments are dependent on 
donor funding, the donors shall be part of the process, support and suggest, but they 
shall do this in a hands-off manner and respect ownership (ODI 2008). The 
relationship is no longer based on conditionality; the partnership opens the possibilities 
for a more equal relation between the donors and recipient, and is aimed at leading to 
more effective aid.  
 
Leadership means the willingness and responsibility to reduce poverty; to carry out the 
task of design, implement, and monitor the PRS process (Entwistle – Filippo 2005). It 
implies that the recipient government, not donors, shall set the agenda for the PRS 
process and content, and that the government is able to conduct the process. For 
                                                 
3 See www.worldbank.org/cdf 
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example, the government has to be responsible for elaborating formal structures for the 
PRS process. Entwistle – Fillippo (2005) give examples of ownership enhancing 
structures. There shall be clarified roles and responsibilities, and coordination 
mechanisms between different levels and functions within the government, to ensure 
that the relationship between different levels of government is functioning well. 
Regular consultation mechanisms with donors and stakeholders will improve the 
probabilities of a good partnership with donors and participation from domestic 
stakeholders. To avoid duplications, the PRS shall also have a clear role in relation to 
other developing strategies in the country. Entwistle – Filippo also stress the 
importance of institutionalising the PRS process into existing domestic systems. 
Moreover, a strong link between the PRS, the annual budget and a Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework4 (MTEF) will increase the likelihood of an implementation of 
the PRS through the budget, which in turn will affect the overall outcome of the PRS 
(World Bank 2008a). This will be easier if the planning and budgeting functions are 
aligned (World Bank 2008a). Then, there is need to look at the practical functioning of 
these structures to sort out whether the government is willing and responsible to carry 
out the PRS process in practice. Reforms such as eliminating corruption and attempts 
to strengthen capacity are examples of indicators of leadership as they will increase the 
likelihood of a better outcome of the PRS.  
 
The hands-off approach implies that donors shall respect the recipient government 
leadership and let the government set the agenda for the PRS process. Donor 
coordination and aid predictability are two concepts often mentioned around the 
partnership and hands-off approach. Donors need to coordinate their aid and 
development projects and programmes in the country to avoid duplications and 
facilitate aid prediction for the recipient government. To strengthen the PRS as the 
leading medium-term development strategy in the country they shall also align their 
aid to domestic systems, especially the PRS, and harmonise their operations in the 
country. Donors also have obligations to support domestic stakeholders, so that these 
can take an active role in the PRS process (OECD 2008a). 
                                                 
4 An MTEF shows a country’s three-year budget spending. See http://go.worldbank.org/80OVWNYE30.  
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2.4 Internal ownership 
Internal ownership refers to the relationship between the recipient government and the 
domestic stakeholders. The government shall lead the PRS process, but in an inclusive 
manner with broad-based stakeholder participation. The idea is that the PRS shall 
reflect a national consensus about the countries’ priorities of poverty reducing policies, 
not only the government agenda. Through participation the strategy is anchored within 
the society, and holds a broad-based political support, which makes it easier for the 
strategy outcome to be successful (Eberlei 2007). This also refers to the democratic 
aspect of ownership; the participation implies representation of interests, 
accountability and the right to influence the policy process in the country (Dürr et al 
2008). Stakeholders that are important for the PRS participation differ between 
countries, but usually the parliament, local authorities and civil society are mentioned 
as legitimate stakeholders in the process (OECD 2008a).  
 
Eberlei (2007) stresses the importance of institutionalised, or meaningful, participation 
for strengthened ownership. He claims there are four important elements of 
participation to be institutionalised: structures, rights, legitimacy, and capacity. The 
government shall include stakeholders through the provision of space, structures and 
rights, for participation. Stakeholders shall participate through the use of the space 
which in turn will be affected by the stakeholder capacity to participate. Moreover, 
stakeholder representation of interests is important for the legitimacy of the PRS 
process, where capacity to represent is crucial. Parliament involvement in the PRS 
process is seen as the most important for the legitimacy of participation since they are 
democratically elected bodies (Eberlei 2007). 
 
The government shall include stakeholders in the PRS process. Stakeholders shall have 
the right to participate, and the inclusion shall be based on formal structures for 
participation, such as consultative mechanisms at all levels and in all parts of the PRS 
process (Entwistle – Filippo 2005). However, the formal structures will not be useful 
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for meaningful participation without other indicators of government inclusion. Rights 
such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press are important for the possibilities 
for the stakeholders to communicate their opinions and wishes for the PRS (Eberlei 
2007). The government shall also provide enough information and make sure 
stakeholders are aware of the implications of the PRS process. Government 
transparency and openness in the process, and the provision of information, is 
important for the domestic accountability and will facilitate meaningful participation 
for stakeholders in the monitoring part of the PRS process (World Bank 2008a).  
 
Participation means that stakeholders influence and share control over the PRS process 
and depends on to what extent stakeholders use the space for participation. The use of 
the space can be of quantitative or qualitative nature. The former refers to the number 
of participants and frequency of participation. The latter implies the ability for 
stakeholders to communicate their wishes and opinions to the decision-makers, the 
capacity to understand issues around the PRS process, and the capacity to represent the 
interests of the ones they claim to represent. 
2.5 Summary 
Ownership is divided into an external and an internal dimension reflecting the 
relationships between different actors in the PRS process. In turn, there are four main 
indicators of ownership affecting the relationships. For example, the leadership and 
hands-off indicators both affect the partnership approach; when recipients take the lead 
and are willing and responsible to carry out the PRS process, donors are more likely to 
use the hands-off approach since they believe in the government. Concerning the 
internal dimension, the stakeholders are more likely to participate when the 
government includes them in the PRS process.  
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3 Ownership in Rwanda 
The different ownership indicators will now be assessed in the case of Rwanda. First, 
there will be a short introduction to the country context. Then there will be a 
description of the formal structures for the Rwandan PRS process set out in different 
government documents. Finally, there will be an assessment of the ownership 
indicators according to the external and internal dimension in relation to the formal 
structures. 
3.1 Country context 
Rwanda is a small and land-locked country in Sub-Saharan Africa sharing borders 
with Uganda in the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, Burundi in 
the south, and Tanzania in the east. Rwanda is one of the world’s 10 most densely 
populated countries, with a population of 10.4 million and 82 % of the population 
living in rural areas (CIA 2009). Rwanda is poor with 60 % of the population below 
the poverty line in 2001 (Ibid.). The GDP per capita is 1000$ and the annual GDP 
growth was 11.2% in 2008 (Ibid.). The main export is coffee and the largest sector is 
agriculture. The country is heavily dependent on aid and half of the government 
budget comes from Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Hayman 2007).  
 
The genocide in 1994 was one of the world’s most tragic incidents in recent history, 
with over 800 000 people killed (World Bank 2009). The genocide was due to a long 
period of economic and political instability which fuelled ethnic tensions between the 
Hutus and the Tutsis (CIA 2009). Today, ethnic labels are banned, but the 
reconciliation process is problematic because of the real and perceived Tutsi political 
dominance (CIA 2009). The Tutsi rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated 
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the Hutu regime and got control of power in July 1994. Today the RPF is still in 
power, with the former rebel leader Paul Kagame as president.  
 
After the genocide in 1994 the country had a devastated economy, non-functioning 
institutions, and a traumatised population. The situation has improved, but there are 
still security concerns in neighbouring countries, and restrictions in political 
competition and human rights (Hayman 2007). However, the recent fifteen years has 
been characterised by remarkable economic and social development which has 
attracted attention internationally.   
 
There are several development strategies in Rwanda. In 2001 the country formulated 
the Vision 2020; a long-term development strategy where it is said that Rwanda shall 
be a middle-income country by 2020. Between 2002 and 2005, Rwanda ran its first 
PRS, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 1 (PRSP1), which was set in a post-
conflict context with focus on reconciliation and development. Currently, the second 
PRS is in place; the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 
2008-2012. The planning of the EDPRS started in 2006 and endured for eighteen 
months. The EDPRS is a comprehensive national development strategy that covers a 
big part of the Rwandan policy structure. There are three big flagships: Economic 
Growth, Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) (a rural development programme), 
and Good Governance. The EDPRS is currently in progress and the government is 
open for changes in the formal structure of the EDPRS process. 
3.2 Formal structures of the EDPRS process  
Looking at the formal structures of the EDPRS process, there are reasons to believe 
that Rwanda has strong ownership. Many of the structures are in line with the 
ownership enhancing structures outlined in the previous chapter. For example, there 
are regular consultative mechanisms with donors as well as domestic stakeholders at 
different levels and in all parts of the EDPRS process, and there are coordinating 
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mechanisms within the government. There is a link to the budget and to an MTEF, the 
comprehensive medium-term EDPRS is translated into sub-strategies for a smoother 
implementation, and the strategy shall be constantly monitored. Information about the 
formal structures is mainly found in documents from the web site of the Rwanda 
Development Partners5, especially the National Planning, Budget and MTEF 
Guidelines (Minecofin 2008), and will therefore not be referred to explicitly in the 
text. In the case of another source, there will be a reference.  
3.2.1 Three levels 
The formal structures for the design, implementation and monitoring parts of the 
EDPRS process are divided into three dimensions: overall, function and area (Sida 
2008). The dimensions refer to the national or central level, the sectors at national 
level, and the local level of government. Donors are involved at all levels through the 
Aid Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment (ACHA) framework, which aims at 
improving development activities with connection to the EDPRS, Vision 2020 and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), through mutual support between GoR and 
donors. Internal stakeholders are also included in this framework, and in the different 
parts of the PRS process, through participation mechanisms for the civil society, the 
private sector and grass-root levels. 
 
                                                 
5 http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=56  
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Figure 2. EDPRS formal structures. 
 
Overall 
The overall dimension relates to the central structures that exist on the level of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Minecofin), the ministers, the secretary 
generals and the president. At this level the process is conducted, overseen, 
coordinated, and there is general guidance provided. In general, the Minecofin leads 
the process and has the overall responsibility. Depending on the part of the process, 
there are different groups and committees involved. For example, the design process 
was led and overseen by the National Steering Committee, consisting of Ministers and 
Province Governors. In the implementation and monitoring parts of the process the 
Cabinet is the highest responsible body and the high-level coordinating work is done 
in the Development Planning Unit at the Minecofin. However, donors and 
stakeholders are included at this level as well. In the design process the Technical 
Steering Committee, consisting of secretary generals from the GoR ministries and 
representatives from donors, civil society and the private sector, coordinated the 
design process and gave guidance and proposals of how to prioritise in the EDPRS. 
There is also a Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG), consisting of GoR 
Secretary Generals, heads of donor agencies, and representatives of civil society and 
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the private sector, which shall assist in the EDPRS process, especially in the 
implementation and monitoring. 
 
Function 
The function-based dimension has a more technical approach. The EDPRS is a 
comprehensive strategy that covers a big part of the policy structure in Rwanda. 
Therefore, different sectors concentrate on different parts of the EDPRS, for example 
education or economic growth, and set out strategies for each sector. The sectors are 
coordinated in twelve Sector Working Groups (SWGs) that each brings together all 
relevant stakeholders within the sector. Each group has a chair from a GoR institution 
(i.e. the relevant ministry for the sector) and a co-chair from the donor side. There are 
some stakeholders that shall be represented in all SWGs: local authorities, civil 
society, private sector, the Parliament, and the Minecofin. The civil society is 
represented through the civil society platform consisting of fifteen umbrella 
organisations covering the whole civil society in Rwanda. The private sector is 
represented through the Rwandan Private Sector Federation, which is the umbrella 
organisation for the private sector.  
 
Area 
Finally, the area-based dimension, structured around Rwanda’s decentralised system, 
takes local needs into account. There are five levels of local government that are 
derived from the traditional division of the country: 5 Provinces, 30 Districts, 416 
Sectors, 2150 Cells, and 14975 Villages. The Province functions as a coordinating 
level between the central government and the decentralised levels. The District level is 
the centre for service delivery and the basic political-administrative unit. This also 
implies that the District is the key institution mediating between the government and 
the citizen. Districts and provinces are involved in the EDPRS process in a formalised 
way through committees (Province Steering Committees and District Steering 
Committees) that communicate with the SWGs. These committees are led by the 
executive secretaries in the Province and District, and the local civil society, faith-
based organisations and the private sector are also supposed to be represented in these 
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committees. Within the ACHA framework, there is a donor coordinating forum at the 
District level called Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) to support the local 
government administration in management of the development process in the District. 
This forum is chaired by the mayor of the District and consists of donors, the local 
civil society, faith-based organisations and the private sector. The local government 
levels also function as a consultation mechanism with the population. There are 
community meetings on a regular basis at every level to consult with people on 
different issues concerning the community. The outcomes of these meetings are 
supposed to be communicated through coordination mechanisms among the different 
levels where the lower level reports to the level above. The decentralisation process is 
currently in progress, which means that the overall governance and participation  are 
likely to increase in the near future through the transfer of administrative functions and 
decision-making power to lower levels of government (Minaloc 2008).  
3.2.2 Design, implementation, monitoring 
Design 
The basis for the elaboration of the EDPRS was laid out in different evaluations of the 
first PRSP1 and a household survey of the state of poverty in the country. There was 
an independent evaluation made by international consultants and joint reviews made 
by the SWGs and the Districts and the lessons from these evaluations were taken into 
account in the formulation of the new strategy. The design of the new strategy 
followed the three-level structure with donor involvement, stakeholder participation 
and coordination among different levels of government. 
 
Implementation 
The EDPRS is implemented through implementing agencies at different levels that 
formulate sub-strategies of the EDPRS. The main part of the implementation is made 
in the District, but the SWGs have a big role in linking the EDPRS with the budget 
through their Sector Strategic Plans (World Bank 2008a). The SWGs translate the 
EDPRS into five-year Sector Strategic Plans which are the basis for the District 
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Development Plans elaborated by each District. In such a way, the EDPRS priorities 
are reflected at all levels, which in turn make the EDPRS the leading national medium-
term strategy. The EDPRS is linked to the budget as each implementing agency 
formulates an annual agency budget and a three-year agency MTEF. As such, the 
budgeting is also made bottom-up. 
 
Monitoring 
In the monitoring process each implementing agency reports to the level above about 
the performance of the implementation. Districts and SWGs write Joint Sector 
Reviews and Joint District Reviews that are coordinated at central level and 
summarised in the Annual Progress Review (APR), the annual report on the overall 
EDPRS implementation. The EDPRS monitoring framework is aimed at strengthening 
the political accountability of the government to the electorate through the regular 
publications of different reports and reviews of the EDPRS implementation. There is 
also a framework for mutual accountability between the GoR and the donors. In the 
Common Performance Assessment Framework (CPAF) donors are to hold the GoR 
accountable for the use of development assistance. The Development Partners’ 
Assessment Matrix (DPAM) is used by the GoR and donors to assess donor behaviour. 
3.3 External ownership 
The analysis of the external ownership follows the government leadership and the 
donor hands-off indicators set out in chapter 2. Issues about the partnership are 
included in the donor hands-off indicator. There have been several findings that 
indicate strong or weak ownership, and these are discussed in different topics under 
each indicator. 
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3.3.1 Government leadership 
One of the most common comments about ownership in Rwanda is that the GoR 
possesses strong leadership in the EDPRS process. There is an eagerness to develop, 
reduce poverty and increase the economic growth (Sida 2009). 
 
Formal structures 
The formal structures indicate willingness and responsibility from the government to 
reduce poverty through the EDPRS. They are elaborated by the government, but all 
stakeholders have also agreed with the PRS, and they take factors of ownership into 
account (Minecofin 2006b). Ceteris paribus, these structures increase the probability 
for a successful outcome of the strategy.  
 
However, there are examples of shortcomings of the functioning of the existing 
EDPRS structures. This is probably due to weaknesses in the government capacity, 
failures in coordination within the government, and because the EDPRS system is still 
in its infancy (Minaloc 2008). Even if the structures are generally good, there is room 
for ameliorations such as integration and streamlining of the EDPRS process in the 
budget framework, better alignment of planning and budgeting functions, and better 
coordination among stakeholders and levels of government, especially between the 
SWGs and the Districts (World Bank 2008a). According to interviewees, the lack of 
capacity is a huge problem for the Rwandan development in general. The capacity in 
sector ministries and at local government levels is weaker than in the Minecofin and 
the Cabinet, which implies that the implementation of the EDPRS is hampered 
(Minaloc 2008). However, one of the interviewees pointed out that the willingness 
from the government is there, and that much would happen if there were more capacity 
and skilled people.  
 
Reforms and policies 
Government reforms and policies for poverty reduction are another indicator of the 
willingness and responsibility of the government to reduce poverty. There are 
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programmes on capacity strengthening and rural development, non-tolerance of 
corruption, and willingness to increase the transparency and openness of government 
(Minaloc 2008). The budget is in line with the EDPRS priorities and the overall budget 
performance in 2008 was good (Minecofin 2009). Moreover, the lessons from the 
evaluations of the PRSP1, which mainly came from the independent evaluators and 
stakeholders, were taken into deep consideration by the government. These lessons 
focused on improving ownership and the prospects for a successful implementation, 
for example by a strengthening of the budget link and a deepening of the integration of 
decentralised levels in the EDPRS process (Minecofin 2006c).  
 
In 2006, the GoR elaborated an Aid Policy that states the government’s position on aid 
and is meant to be a coordinating tool for aid. The government has expectations of 
donor behaviour in terms of giving aid in line with national priorities such as the 
EDPRS simplify procedures, and enhance local ownership of development activities 
(GoR 2006b). The Aid Policy is another example of the government leadership; the 
GoR has put its foot down and wants donors to coordinate and align the aid in line 
with GoR wishes. 
 
High level leadership and support for the GoR 
The president Paul Kagame is an example of high level leadership in the EDPRS 
process, as he is strongly committed to the fight of poverty and has a zero tolerance 
against corruption (Minaloc 2008). The high level leadership increases the likelihood 
for a better outcome of the EDPRS. The president and the GoR, including the leading 
RPF party, have strong support among the Rwandan population, and according to a 
national survey in 2007, 97 % of the population think the government has done much 
good for the country (NURC 2007). This implies there is strong support for the 
EDPRS among the population. 
 
The commitment from the president and the government to reduce poverty might be a 
way for them to gain legitimacy among Rwandans. As Paul Kagame and the RPF 
originate from the Tutsi rebels who took power by force in 1994, they have to deliver 
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results to the population to gain support. Interviewees also claim that the strong lead 
from the government might originate in a fear of new ethnic tensions coming up, and 
that the government has to give the population an alternative to conflict in terms of 
development.  
 
However, there are some controversial aspects about the presidential and government 
leadership, and the support from the population. Much power is concentrated in the 
president, both constitutionally and in practice (Freedom House 2008). “The 
president’s word is the law”, one of the donor interviewees said and pointed to the 
strong leadership in dealing with the ministers. Even if the prospects for a re-election 
of the current president are good, Rwanda can not rely on this person only. Therefore, 
a long-lasting high level leadership seems weaker. Additionally, the strong support 
among the population might be due to lack of political alternative, a tradition of 
consensus based policy setting, and the authoritarian tradition in the country where 
powerful leaders have controlled the population (The Economist 2009). These 
restrictions of democracy raise concerns about the legitimacy of the EDPRS process. 
3.3.2 Partnership and donor hands-off 
The formal structures for the partnership between the GoR and donors are generally 
good, with space for negotiation and a balanced relationship within the ACHA 
framework. However, there are certain issues that make the relationship complicated, 
and the hands-off approach is not used all the time.  
 
Donors believe in the GoR 
Generally, donors believe in the government leadership and think the GoR seems 
genuinely willing and responsible to conduct the EDPRS process. Hayman (2007) 
points out that the GoR is talking the language of international development and that it 
has committed to international norms of development. The policies and reforms for 
poverty reduction, the lessons from the PRSP1, and the Aid Policy are examples of 
this. Therefore, donors have said they respect country ownership and will let the GoR 
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take the lead in preparing plans and budgets (GoR 2006). One of the interviewees 
mentioned that another example of donors’ commitment to the GoR is that they keep 
providing assistance to the GoR in times of financial crises because they see results 
from the EDPRS. The APR 2008 points to a successful implementation of the EDPRS 
in 2008 even though there are some shortcomings (Minecofin 2009d). 
 
Negotiation position 
In general, donors listen to the government; they do not have a policy-imposing 
approach. According to donor interviewees they provide support and use dialogue, 
negotiation, and persuasion as methods for deciding upon policies and aid, in case of 
diverging agendas. For example, this was used in the design process of the EDPRS and 
the trade-off on the priorities between export and agriculture. In the early draft of the 
EDPRS the GoR wanted to have a strongly export oriented strategy to be more reliant 
on export revenues and get away from the aid dependency. Donors did not see this as a 
realistic development approach because of the poorly developed rural sector. Instead, 
they argued there had to be efforts to reform the agricultural sector to secure the food 
production. In this case, the GoR listened to donor advice and agreed to do more for 
the agriculture sector.  
 
The government shows a strong leadership towards the donors. One of the 
interviewees claims the government added the VUP in the final draft of the EDPRS 
without consulting the donors. The government held strongly on to its agenda and in 
the end donors accepted this final EDPRS even if they did not agree on all policies. 
 
However, there are examples where donors have sanctioned the government. In 
December 2008 the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 
retracted the budget support because GoR financed rebels in Congo (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2008). Even if this is not directly connected to the EDPRS it shows the 
vulnerability in the partnership approach. The fact that donors have the power to 
retract aid money, or go against GoR wishes if they do not like the GoR agenda, shows 
imbalances in the relationship; Rwanda is the aid-dependent party.  
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Coordination 
Coordination between donors and the GoR is a part of the partnership. For example, 
the Sector Working Group coordination among donors and GoR institutions is 
important for the overall performance. There is a wide range of stakeholders included 
in the SWGs, as well as sub-sector groups, which increases the importance of 
coordination. The coordination is dependent on the leadership in the SWG; the GoR 
chair and the donor co-chair. The leadership has to be strong, the chairs have to agree, 
and there is need for understanding of the importance of coordination among the 
various actors included in the sector.  
 
For example, the coordination in the education SWG is working quite well because the 
lead donor has put effort into this. On the contrary, the health SWG is less coordinated 
because the health ministry has not understood the importance of coordination and the 
donor lead is not engaged (Hayman 2007). Hence, lack of a clear leadership from the 
donor is often a big constraint to the coordination of the SWG since the GoR lead 
institution does not have the capacity to coordinate alone (Hayman 2007). One of the 
donor interviewees admits that donors seldom want to take the responsibility as a co-
chair as it requires a lot of work. This implies the outcome of the SWGs is reliant on 
the donor engagement; once again the GoR is dependent on the donors. 
 
Budget support and domestic system  
According to the Aid Policy the GoR wants donors to harmonise their programmes, 
align aid to the EDPRS, use the domestic system, and provide 100 % of the financial 
assistance in the form of budget support. This will make it easier for the government to 
plan and predict aid. Donors have agreed on most targets in the Aid Policy but are not 
willing to provide 100 % budget support, they can agree on 85 % (GoR 2006b). 
According to the GoR DPAM assessment of donor performance in 2008 most of the 
donors are off track according to the outlined targets (Minecofin 2009a). The total 
provision of budget support was 55 % in 2008, which is insufficient for the GoR target 
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of 100 % in 2010. Nor is the use of domestic systems on track for the 66 % target to be 
met in 2010 (Minecofn 2009a). 
 
There is a wide range of donors in Rwanda and the performance and attitudes of the 
hands-off approach diverges among donors. Here is an overview of the top eight 
bilateral donors in Rwanda in the years 2001 and 2007. The other table shows the 
provision of budget support in 2008. 
 
Table 1. Donors in Rwanda. 
 
 
The type of aid can vary from general budget support to programme support to specific 
projects, and donors in Rwanda are represented along the whole scale. For example, 
the USAID have almost only small-scale projects run by themselves. Sida is not 
satisfied with their own use of domestic systems; they want to improve since they 
believe in using domestic systems. Hence, the donors are not fully using the hands-off 
approach. 
 
However, a donor interviewee claims that the hands-off approach is somewhat 
complicated in Rwanda as there is lack of capacity in the domestic systems. For 
Top Eight Bilateral Donors in Rwanda 
 2001 2007 
Donor 
Total 
US$m Donor 
Total 
US$m
United Kingdom  60.0 United Kingdom 95.0 
United States  36.4 United States  90.8 
Netherlands  33.1 Belgium  42.7 
Germany  23.8 Netherlands  27.8 
Belgium  20.1 Germany  23.1 
France  18.4 Sweden  21.8 
Sweden  14.2 Japan  19.5 
Canada  11.3 Canada  9.7 
Percentage of ODA as 
Budget Support 2008 
Donor %
Netherlands 79
Belgium 76
United Kingdom 74
Sweden 54
Japan 43
Canada  33
United States 1
Germany na
Source: OECD 2009 
Source: Minecofin 2009 
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example, donors face difficulties in the use of the revenue authority on the reporting of 
how the aid money is used. Bilateral donors have to report on off-budget assistance to 
the GoR, as well as have obligations of reporting to the own country. For example, 
agencies in Rwanda do not report their revenues on time, or at all, because of the weak 
capacity. Hence, donors are not always able to use the domestic system. There is a 
trade-off in using the domestic systems and parallel or own systems; on the one hand it 
is important to use domestic systems as it will help in building them up; on the other 
hand, the use of own systems will increase the likelihood for a better outcome. 
Another example of the difficulties in using the hands-off approach is the budget 
support. Donors claim they can not provide 100 % budget support since they want to 
support non-governmental stakeholders or activities such as free media, capacity to 
have a critical view of the government, or women’s participation in certain processes. 
Hence, sometimes the government is not the right channel for aid. 
3.4 Internal ownership 
The assessment of internal ownership is structured as the previous section with 
different topics discussed under the government inclusion and the stakeholder 
participation indicators.  
3.4.1 Government inclusion 
“The EDPRS is a national strategy and involves all levels of Rwandan society. Sector 
Working Groups bring together central and local government institutions, development 
partners, civil society and the private sector. Districts will be particularly involved in 
discussions about effective implementation of the EDPRS. Ministers will be 
responsible for validating the strategy.” (Minecofin 2006).  
 
This is the introduction in a GoR document on the EDPRS planning process, and much 
of the government’s intent is reflected in the formal structures for the EDPRS process. 
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The government is providing space for participation in all parts of the process and at 
all levels, and it seems to understand the importance of participation and the anchoring 
of the EDPRS among the population. Interviewees from donors, GoR officials and 
domestic stakeholders talk about the government as inclusive and the formal structures 
have been praised for their inclusiveness (World Bank 2008b). However, when 
looking closer the picture is more blurred; there are indicators that point to inclusive 
features, as well as indicators of a non-inclusive government.  
 
Provision of information 
Even though the formal structures are good, there are complaints about the 
government working too fast and that this decreases the efficiency of the participation. 
For example, according to a donor interviewee the local level finds it difficult to plan, 
implement and report on time because of the short time frames from the central 
government, and in consultations with grass-root levels government officials do not 
provide enough information for the population to get versed in the process. The central 
government wants to develop and move fast, but the local levels are not able to follow. 
 
There have been concerns about the openness in the budget process. In 2008 the Open 
Budget Survey Rwanda scored 0 out of 100 in the provision of budget information to 
the public during the budget year (OBS 2009). However, when the government 
became aware of this, it changed the policy to be more inclusive; now the Minecofin 
publishes documents about the budget process in newspapers and on the web.  
 
This is one example of the willingness from the government to improve the 
information provision, the openness and transparency of government, and the 
strengthening of accountability. The EDPRS flagship Good Governance is an example 
of this, and there is a general increased understanding of the importance of these issues 
(Minaloc 2008).  
 
Another positive feature of the information provision is the translated version of the 
EDPRS into the local language Kinyarwanda. There is already a translated version of 
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the Vision 2020 and the government has information campaigns in the city as well as 
in rural areas to inform the population about the development strategies. The Vision 
2020 is widely known among the population and now the government wants to spread 
the information about the EDPRS (World Bank 2008a).  
 
Government listening to stakeholders 
The inclusiveness does not only depend on the formal structures for participation; the 
government also has to listen to the participants and take their opinions into 
consideration. The evaluations in the beginning of the design process were the most 
participative and inclusive element in the EDPRS process because the government 
took the lessons from the evaluations into account; the government listened to the 
stakeholders. Moreover, the household survey made before deciding on the EDPRS 
priorities implied the strategy was based upon facts about the poor and that they were 
included in the process. However, one of the donor interviewees claims that the 
technocrats took over and formulated the EDPRS after the evaluations. The 
interviewee argues that even if the structures are inclusive, the government strongly 
holds on to its agenda and usually does not listen to the stakeholders.  
 
Another donor interviewee claims the government is not listening to the civil society 
because lack of capacity and knowledge of the issues among CSOs, except for a few 
stronger organisations. The government “ignores noise but listens to substance” and 
thinks that most of the CSO participation is “noise” and that most CSOs are not 
contributing to the process in a constructive way. Interviewees from some of the 
stronger CSOs claim they have been included in the process, and that their opinions 
were taken into account even if everything was not reflected in the EDPRS.  
 
What does this imply for the ownership indicator of government inclusion? Does the 
government include sufficiently or does it have to listen to the stakeholders to a greater 
extent? Or is it up to stakeholders to use the space provided and start contributing to 
the process in a more meaningful way? What comes first, government inclusion or 
stakeholder capacity to participate? These questions can not be answered here, but the 
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government has a point in that it is not able to listen to everything; the time is limited 
and the government wants to develop fast. However, it might also be up to the 
government to strengthen the capacity among stakeholders; capacity building can be 
seen as a sign of inclusion.  
 
Open debate 
Rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, etc. 
are under stress in Rwanda, which affects the prospects for the space for open debate 
(Freedom House, Minaloc 2008). Even though there have been improvements in the 
legal framework in recent years, the practical implications of these improvements have 
not been seen (Minaloc 2008). Moreover, the politics in Rwanda is based on consensus 
and power sharing, and in practice the RPF controls the agenda and public debate 
(Minaloc 2008). These restrictions of democracy and freedom of expression affect the 
public debate; the citizens do not speak out loud and the government is hardly ever 
criticised in public (Minaloc 2008). Thus, there is space for participation, but the 
openness of the space can be questioned.  
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Figure 3. World Governance Indicators. 
Source: WGI 2009 
 
The World Governance Indicators illustrate the state of open debate in Rwanda. The 
indicator of voice and accountability measures the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media (WGI 2009). When looking at the diagram 
above, other governance indicators have increased in the last decade, while the voice 
and accountability has not improved. This might show the government approach to 
continuing the restrictions on democracy and human rights, which in turn affects the 
prospects for inclusion in the EDPRS process. However, it is argued that this has to be 
seen in the light of the genocide; there is fear of new ethnic tensions coming up 
(Minaloc 2008). The government argues there have to be restrictions on political 
competition and freedom of speech to keep the security and hinder riots from coming 
up.  
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3.4.2 Stakeholder participation 
The outcome of the participation in practice relies on the stakeholders; the extent to 
which they use the government provided space will determine the state of 
participation. In general, the participation is broad-based in quantitative measures, but 
there are several factors indicating a less qualitative participation. 
 
The stakeholders in Rwanda – the Parliament, local government and civil society – are 
weak institutions. Even though there is participation in terms of stakeholders attending 
meetings, discussions and forums within the EDPRS process, the weakness of the 
stakeholders weakens the extent of participation. Capacity is seen as the biggest 
constraint for participation in Rwanda (Minaloc 2008). Together with the comment 
that there is strong government leadership in the EDPRS, this is the most common 
observation among the interviewees. The education level is low in Rwanda and the big 
poor population does not have the capacity to control the government, which implies 
the weak accountability. Capacity in terms of understanding of the EDPRS, education, 
number of skilled people, equipment, and financial resources, are a big constraint to 
participation as well as a successful outcome of the EDPRS.  
 
Parliament 
The Parliament is one of the weakest institutions in Rwanda and there are great 
imbalances between the GoR and the Parliament in terms of power and capacity 
(Minaloc 2008). Constitutionally the Parliament has a representative, legislative and 
overseeing function and different groups of the society must be represented, i.e. 
women, youths and disabled (Minaloc 2008). Hence, the Parliament could be a good 
representative of the population, but the lack of skills and understanding of the EDPRS 
hinders this. As parliament involvement in the PRS process is one of the most 
important requirements for a legitimate process, the weak capacity of the Parliament 
and the lack of representation is a big constraint to the Rwandan ownership.  
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The role of the Parliament in the EDPRS process is somewhat unclear. The terms of 
reference for the SWGs declares that the Parliament shall have one representative in 
each group. However, according to most of the interviewees, this is not the case in 
practice; there are no parliamentarians in the SWGs. Instead, the Parliament shall 
participate indirect through overseeing of the budget and the process so that they are 
able to put questions to responsible ministers. Whether the role of the Parliament is to 
participate directly in the SWGs or if its role is to control the EDPRS process does not 
matter for ownership in this case; the Parliament is weak and is not able to represent 
the interests of the citizens. Even if there are some parliamentarians who understand 
the process and ask critical questions of ministers, the legitimacy can not rely on these 
individuals. 
 
Local government 
According to the interviewees, there is broad-based participation in community 
meetings at the local government levels. In the 2007 social cohesion survey 91% of 
respondents agreed that “citizens take part in decision-making on problems concerning 
them” (NURC). These numbers might indicate a participative feature at the local 
levels. However, the extent of participation is limited to the frequency of meetings and 
the number of attendants. The local government lacks capacity to communicate the 
views and opinions of the citizens to higher levels. This is not only due to the weak 
capacity of the local authorities, but also because of the weak coordination among 
different levels of government, the short time frames from the central government, and 
the newly introduced formal structures.  
 
Civil society 
The civil society in Rwanda is big with over 37 000 community-based organisations 
(96 % of the whole civil society) (NURC 2007). There are relatively few organisations 
dealing with policy advocacy and government overseeing, which implies that the 
function as a watch-dog, or a counter weight to the government, is not strong (Minaloc 
2008). An interviewee from the civil society states that the civil society adjusts its 
agendas instead to the EDPRS and works together with the government.  
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The civil society participates at central, sector and local levels. Theoretically, the 
platform covers every segment of the civil society since it incorporates fifteen 
umbrella CSOs, but interviewees maintain that in practice the lack of capacity limits 
the ability to represent. There are only a few rather strong CSOs, and their base is in 
the capital of Kigali. Outside the offices of the organisations, most parts of the civil 
society do not know about the EDPRS issues, especially not the technical parts. 
Moreover, there is seldom information about the target groups of the organisations, 
which implies they do not know what to claim in the EDPRS process. There is lack of 
skilled people, human capital, and financial resources. This lack of capacity limits the 
legitimacy of the EDPRS process as well as hinders the CSOs from doing their work.  
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4 Summary and conclusions 
According to the definition of ownership used in this study, there is a mixed picture of 
the state of ownership in Rwanda. On the one hand, the government leadership is 
strong and there is willingness and responsibility to carry out the EDPRS process in an 
inclusive way. On the other hand, the participation among the domestic stakeholders 
does not fulfil the requirements of meaningful participation since stakeholders lack 
capacity to represent and understand the EDPRS process and because the space for 
public debate is limited. However, the external and internal dimensions of ownership 
in Rwanda are complex and it is difficult to determine the state of ownership. The 
complexity also raises concern about the usefulness of the concept of ownership. As 
said in the introduction, the concept is vague, ambiguous and contradictory, and this 
becomes even more evident after this study. 
 
The partnership between GoR and its donors is complicated. The contradictions in the 
concept of ownership become even more obvious when looking at Rwanda whose 
government already possesses a strong lead towards its donors. Rwanda is still an aid-
dependent country and there are several examples of where the state of ownership can 
be questioned due to donor behaviour. The partnership implies there have to be 
negotiations on the PRS, but since donors have more power in terms of money there 
are concerns about whether the partnership is equal. There have been examples of 
donors using their power to extract aid, or that declines in their engagement have 
negative effects on the outcome of the EDPRS. Hence, donors affect the EDPRS 
process in areas which the GoR can not control. Moreover, donors claim they have 
certain values to protect and can not always accept the government agenda and use the 
hands-off approach. For example, the authoritarian feature of Rwanda might imply 
donors do not always want to support the government and that they raise conditions on 
the provided aid. On the one hand, one can claim a country can not have ownership as 
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long as donors are involved and pose these conditions. On the other hand, donors have 
to be involved in the policy process since they are responsible to make sure the aid 
money is not devastating the recipient country. This is a problematic feature of 
ownership and the aid system in general. In this case the state of ownership depends on 
to what extent conditionality is included in the concept.  
 
The state of the internal ownership also gives a mixed picture, even if the conclusion is 
that ownership is weak. The government does provide space for participation, but the 
space is not enough; there is need for a more open public debate in terms of freedom 
of expression. Moreover, stakeholders participate in quantitative measures, but the 
weak capacity of stakeholders implies that they can not represent their interests, and 
that they do not understand the EDPRS process. Hence, Rwanda is an example of a 
country where capacity is crucial for ownership and that the two concepts are mutually 
reinforcing; the central government capacity is strong, which implies strong 
leadership, and the stakeholder capacity is weak which implies participation is weak. 
The crucial factor of parliament involvement is not present in Rwanda and the weak 
capacity of the parliament weakens the state of ownership even more; there is no scope 
for a democratic PRS process. However, there are capacity building programmes in 
progress and the decentralisation process will continue to improve participation at 
local levels. This might imply a stronger internal ownership in the future.  
 
Taking the two dimensions together the overall assessment implies the country 
ownership in Rwanda is weak. This is somewhat surprising because of the perceptions 
of strong ownership in Rwanda. However, compared to other countries, the strong lead 
and the large quantity of participation might show a stronger ownership in Rwanda.  
Rather, this calls for a mixed picture of ownership; it is both strong and weak. 
However, the conclusion made in this study is based on the assumption that the 
participation aspect is more important than the government leadership; the emphasis in 
the definition is put on the internal dimension of ownership. This shows that the 
definition of ownership is crucial for the statement of ownership and that policy 
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analysts have to be aware of the meaning of ownership before drawing conclusions 
about the state of ownership in a country.  
 
However, putting emphasis on the internal dimension of ownership might also be 
problematic. Maybe a broadening of the concept of ownership, including a further 
discussion of democratic ownership (as in the Accra Agenda for Action), is too broad 
and incorporates too many factors for the concept to be effective. When ownership 
includes factors such as democracy and capacity, it is hard to point to policy 
implications for a country to be able to improve the state of ownership and better carry 
out its PRS. However, if a clear definition of ownership is made, the concept might be 
useful. Therefore, in this broadening of the concept of ownership there is need for 
further discussion about the definition and implications of ownership before using it; 
the concept will not be useful as long as it is vague and slippery. 
 41
References 
Buiter, Willem H. (2007). “’Country ownership’: a term whose time has gone”, 
Development in Practice,17:4, p. 647-652. 
CIA (2009). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rw.html. 2009-10-21. Central Intelligence Agecy. 
Cling, J-P., Razafindrakoto, M., Roubaud, F. (2002). Les Nouvelles Stratégies 
Internationales de la Lutte Contre la Pauvreté. Paris, Economica. 
Cornwall, A. – Brock, K. (2005). “Beyond Buzzwords. ‘Poverty Reduction’, 
‘Participation’ and ‘Empowerment’ in the Development Policy”. United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development. Programme Paper Number 10.  
Dürr et al (2008). “Poverty Reduction Strategies, Democratization and the role of the 
World Bank”. Working Paper no 39, 2008. University of Zurich. 
Eberlei, W. (2007). “Accountability in Poverty Reduction Strategies: The Role of 
Empowerment and Participation”. Social Development Paper, 104. World Bank. 
Entwistle, J. – Filippo C. (2005). “An Operational Approach to Assessing Country 
Ownership of Povery Reduction Strategies”. Operations Policy and Country 
Services, World Bank. 
Freedom House (2008). “Freedom in the World – Rwanda” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008&country=74
76. 
GoR (2006a). “Joint Donors Statement of Intent”. Kigali, Government of Rwanda. 
GoR (2006b). “Rwanda Aid Policy”. Kigali, Government of Rwanda. 
Hayman, R. (2006). The complexity of aid: government strategies, donor agendas and 
the coordination of development assistance in Rwanda 1994–2004. PhD 
Dissertation, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh. 
Hayman, R. (2007). “‘Milking the Cow’: Negotiating Ownership of Aid and Policy in 
Rwanda.” Global Economic Governance Working Paper 2007/26, University 
College Oxford. 
 42
IMF (2009). http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm 2009-10-21. 
International Monetary Fund. 
Mills, R. – Darin-Ericsson, L. (2002). “Building ownership of antipoverty strategies”. 
http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informesTematicos/15.html. 2009-09-05. 
Minaloc (2008). “Joint Governance Assessment Report”. 
http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/IMG/pdf_JGA_PGF_23-09-08.pdf. Kigali, Ministry 
of Local Government. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/11214/a/117770. 
2009-10-19. 
Minecofin (2006a). “Producing the EDPRS – a user guide”. Kigali, Ministry of 
Finance and Ecnonmic Planning. 
Minecofin (2006b). “Guide to EDPRS process”. Kigali, Ministry of Finance and 
Ecnonmic Planning. 
Minecofin (2006c). “EDPRS process Launch Workshop Key Issues and 
Recommendations”. Kigali, Ministry of Finance and Ecnonmic Planning. 
Minecofin (2008). “Planning, Budgeting and MTEF Guidelines”. Kigali, Ministry of 
Finance and Ecnonmic Planning.  
Minecofin (2009a).  “Donor Performance in 2008”. Kigali, Ministry of Finance and 
Ecnonmic Planning. 
Minecofin (2009b). “Annual Progress Report 2008”. Kigali, Ministry of Finance and 
Ecnonmic Planning. 
Minecofin (2009c). “Budget Execution Report for the year 2008”. Kigali, Ministry of 
Finance and Ecnonmic Planning. 
Minecofin (2009d). “Annual Report on the Implementation on the Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 2008-2012”. Kigali, 
Ministry of Finance and Ecnonmic Planning. 
Morrissey, O. – Verschoor, A. (2003). “What Does Ownership Mean in Practice? 
Policy Learning and The Evaluation of Pro-Poor Policies in Uganda”. Paper 
presented at DSA Annual Conference, September, Glascow.  
NURC (2007). ”Social Cohesion in Rwanda”, Kigali, National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission, 
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/documents/researches/Social_cohesion_in_Rwanda.pdf.  
OBS (2008). “Open Budget Index Rwanda”. 
http://www.openbudgetindex.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2424&hd=1 
2009-10-21. Open Budget Initiative. 
 43
OECD (2005). ”The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2008a): “Whose Ownership? Whose Leadership” in Roundtable Summaries, 
Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Accra 2008 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/52/41572502.pdf. Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2008b). “Accra agenda for action”. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf. Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2009). “ODA by recipient country” DAC online datasets. 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_RECIPIENT. Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
ODI (2008). “Aid effectiveness after Accra: How to reform the ‘Paris agenda’”. 
Breifing Paper 39, Overseas Development Institute. 
Raffinot, M. (2009). “Ownership: l’appropriation des politiques de développement, de 
la théorie à la mise en pratique”  No DT/2009/02, DIAL Working Papers. Paris, 
Développement, Institutions & Analyses de Long terme. 
Sida (2008). “Growth and Poverty in Rwanda: Evaluating the EDPRS 2008-2012”. 
Country Economic Report 2008:3, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency. 
Sida (2009a). http://www.sida.se/English/Countries-and-
regions/Africa/Rwanda/Developments-in-Rwanda/. 2009-10-19. Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency. 
Sida (2008). “Growth and Poverty in Rwanda: Evaluating the EDPRS 2008-2012” 
Country Economic Report 2008:3, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency. 
The Economist (2003). “International: Kagame won, a little too well; Rwanda's 
presidential election”. The Economist, Vol 368, 8339, p 31.32.  
UN (2008). “The Least Developed Countries Report 2008” UNCTAD/LDC/2008. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
WGI (2009). http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp. World 
Governance Indicators. 
World Bank (2008a). “Minding The Gaps: Integrating Poverty Reduction Strategies 
and Budgets For Domestic Accountability” 
http://go.worldbank.org/O0AD1SDZX0. World Bank. 
 44
World Bank (2008b). “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Joint IDA-IMF Staff 
Advisory Note” Report no 42773 http://go.worldbank.org/GWNHYX1J40. 
World Bank. 
World Bank (2009). “Rwanda Country Brief”. http://go.worldbank.org/YP79K5BDT0. 
World Bank. 
List of Interviewees 
ARDEN Richard, Senior Human Development Advisor, DFID. 
BACKÉUS Karl, Second Secretary / Programme Officer, Economist and Budget 
Support Cooperation, Development Cooperation Section, Embassy of Sweden. 
BADE Jan, First Secretary Economic Development, Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. 
ERICSSON Malin, Second Secretary / Programme Officer, Human Rights and 
Democratic Government, Development Cooperation Section, Embassy of 
Sweden Support Cooperation. 
HABIMANA Andre, Director of Development Planning, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning. 
HEGAZY Farid, Head of Promotion of Economy and Employment Program, German 
Technical Cooperation. 
KABERA Godfrey, M&E specialist EDPRS, Development Planning Unit, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning. 
KAMURASE Alex, Operations Officer, Rwanda Country Office, World Bank. 
KAREGA Vincent, Minister of State in Charge of Environment and Mines, Ministry 
of Natural Resources. 
KAREKEZI Thaddée, Permanent Secretary, Rwanda Civil Society Platform. 
MASAMBO Sylvester, Project advisor on parliament, UNDP/DiFID. 
MIHIGO Jeanne d’Arc, Program Officer, Democratic Governance, Development 
Cooperation Section, Embassy of Sweden. 
MIYONKURU Aline, EDPRS Monitoring and Evaluation in Health Sector, Ministry 
of Health. 
MUPIGANYI Apollinaire, Acting Esecutive Secretary, Transparency Rwanda. 
 45
MUTAMBA John, Gender Specialist, Central Regional Office, UNIFEM. 
OSODO Patrick, Program Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid. 
RURANGA James Musiime, EDPRS Monitoring and Evaluation Facilitator DCPETA 
Sector, Ministry of Local Government. 
RWIVANGA Peace, Board Member and Co-funder, Assist-Rwanda. 
SAFARI Emmanuel, Executive Secretary, Cladho. 
VUNINGOMA Faustin, Executive Secretary, CCOAIB. 
 
 
MINOR FIELD STUDY SERIES (A complete list can be ordered from Department 
of Economics, University of Lund, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden) 
 
174 
 
Christian Svensson Dynamics of Special Economic Areas in South China – 
Industrial Upgrading and Improving Working 
Conditions. 2007:1 
 
175 Josefina Danielsson 
Johanna Persson 
Explaining the Success of the Indian IT Industry. 
2007:2 
176 Maria Holmlund Income Poverty – A Case Study of Sri Lanka 
2007:3 
177 Emmylou Tuvhag The Costa Rican Experience of Fair Trade Coffee – 
Impact on producers and producer organisations 
2007:4 
 
178 
 
Mikael Fridell Exploring the Roles of Informal, Formal and 
Semiformal Microcredit in Jordan. 2007:5 
 
179 Åsa Hindenborg On the Role of Remittances in Microfinance –  
Creating Transnational Financial Services in El 
Salvador. 2007:6 
 
180 Linna Palmqvist Corporate Social Responsibility and Development – A 
case study of the CSR strategies of international 
companies in India. 2007:7 
 
181 Peter Holmvall Remittances and Poverty – A case study of the 
Philippines. 2007:8 
182 Charlotta Undén Multinational Corporations and Spillovers in Vietnam – 
Adding Corporate Social Responsibility. 2007:9 
 
183 Emil Samnegård How Does Fairtrade Affect the Market? A Case Study 
in South Africa. 2007:10 
 
184 Emma Svensson Microfinance, Financial Systems and Economic 
Growth – A Theoretical Framework and Findings from 
Bolivia. 2007:11 
 
185 Sonja Luoma 
Maria Persson 
A Path to a Life of Dreams? A Study on Financial 
Markets, Microcredit and Gender in Uganda. 2008:1 
 
186 Gabriel Andréasson Evaluating the Effects of Economic Sanctions against 
Burma. 2008:2 
187 Katarina Öjteg Socio-economic Determinants of HIV in Zambia – A 
District-level Analysis. 2009:1 
188 Tora Bäckman Fairtrade Coffee and Development – A Field Study in 
Ethiopia. 2009:2 
189 Sara Forssell Rice Price Policy in Thailand – Policy Making and 
Recent Developments. 2009:3 
190 Tora Hammar Trade Facilitation in Vietnam – Recent Progress and 
Impact. 2009:4 
191 Joakim Persson The Impact of a Quota System on Women’s 
Empowerment – A Field Study in West Bengal, India. 
2009:5 
 
192 Erudita Hoti Remittances and Poverty in Albania. 2009:6 
193 Anna Andersson Made in Madagascar – The Impact of Rules of Origin 
on the Textile and Clothing Industry. 2009:7 
 
194 Sigrid Colnerud 
Granström 
The Informal Sector and Formal Competitiveness in 
Senegal. 2009:8 
195 Elin Jönsson 
Elin Åkerman 
Direct Cash Transfer and Food Security in Georgia. 
2009:9 
196 Ylva Kalin FDI in Colombia – Policy and Economic Effects. 
2009:10 
197 Lisa Curman Ownership of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in 
Rwanda. 2009:11 
 
